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COMMENTS
THE PROSPECT OF PRIVATE UNAUTHORIZED
EUGENICS AND TEN FEET TALL
BASKETBALL PLAYERS: A CASE
OF LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT?
Novel genetic characterisitics in animals have been an essential compo-
nent in the process of man's evolution from some unknown primordial
chemical machinery. Random changes in a DNA sequence produce differ-
ences in how an animal can survive and reproduce.' For the past five years,
however, mankind has possessed the capacity to choose at least some of the
genetic characteristics of subsequent generations in a manner never known
in the entire course of evolution. One thesis of this article is the real possibil-
ity that a private, well-trained individual will successfully perform the rele-
vant experiments on human embryos without authorization. In view of
available remedies, certain light-handed government controls are needed2 to
help prevent the occurrence of this contingency. This argument is supported
by the daring behavior of a small number of highly respected investigators of
the past and present. In an effort to narrow the issues, a scenario is proposed
in which all the usual forms of authorization under law are skirted or inad-
vertently avoided by a well-intentioned and rational experimenter. In this
context, any ethical and moral issues regarding the propriety of the experi-
1. This is a modem view of Darwin's theory of evolution, incorporating present-day
knowledge that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the chemical constituent which directs the
physical form and content of an animal. Classically, these random changes are viewed as
mutations, which are changes in one bit of the information stored in DNA. See generally G.
SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW (1981); Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code:
Jurisprudential Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976).
It is now also known that nature can simultaneously change a large collection of the bits of
information by transposons, which are "cassette"-like pieces of DNA See, e.g., Fedoroff,
Transposable Genetic Elements in Maize, 250 Sci. AM. 84 (1984).
2. "The prospect of creating an actual being with partially human characteristics offends
a deeply held taboo. There is, however, no legal or regulatory prohibition of such a step." See
Capron, Ethical and Social Issues in the Application of Genetic Engineering to Human Beings:
Statement to Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Tech-
nology, United States House of Representatives, 6 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 3,
6-7 (1983).
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ment itself are probably irrelevant, not because the experiment is a priori
unethical or immoral, but for the reason that no prior approval from an
Institutional Review Board or other ethics committee is stipulated to occur
before the experiment is initiated. It is concluded that existing laws and
regulations are not adequate to compel prior ethics review or to stop the
experiment before it is initiated.
Recombinant DNA (rDNA)3 has made possible great strides in the labo-
ratory preparation of microorganism capable of expressing foreign proteins
by inserting a foreign piece of DNA into the microorganism and expressing
it.4 What precipitated the 1975 Asilomar Conference,5 a voluntary gather-
ing of scientists to discuss and suggest guidelines for rDNA research, was in
part the problem of which insertions into microorganisms should not be
made,6 as illustrated by a tumor virus, or portion thereof, that might pro-
duce a highly infectious form of cancer if inserted into a standard and well
known microorganism of the human gastrointestinal tract.7
I. SUPERMICE ARE ALIVE AND WELL
While opinions differ on the effects of the resulting guidelines for rDNA
research,8 insufficient attention has been focused9 on a subsequent applica-
3. The current acronym for recombinant DNA in law periodicals is "rDNA," which
may be confused with the same acronym meaning ribosomal DNA in some science periodicals.
Several current synonyms for recombinant DNA include "genetic engineering," a designation
intended to create the impression that splicing DNA is something that an engineer could do
(the engineer could do it nowadays); "biotechnology," a term apparently originating from the
professional community of patent lawyers; "molecular biology," a phrase having academic
origins, e.g., the Department of Biochemistiry and Molecular Biology at Harvard; "biochemis-
try," the broad scientific discipline concerning the molecular basis for the metabolism of cell
and of multicellular organisms; "microbiology" is the biochemistry and immunology of cells,
bacteria, viruses, viroids, and other microscopic pathogenic agents.
4. For the purposes of this article an insert is a piece of DNA having an origin foreign to
the animal cell or microorganism into which it is inserted. Insertion of the appropriate piece of
DNA creates a microorganism or animal cell that expresses an active protein corresponding to
the insert. See, e.g., Seeburg, et. al., Synthesis of Growth Hormone by Bacteria, 276 NATURE
795 (1978) (an early example of expression of a foreign gene insert in Escherischia coli). Ex-
pression involves the processes of, inter alia. transcription and translation. For an excellent
introduction to the entire field of rDNA, see J. WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE
GENE (1977).
5. For an official summary of the conference, see Berg, Asilomar Conference on Recombi-
nant DNA Molecules, 188 Scl. 991 (1975).
6. It was concluded that highly pathogenic organisms, Le, Class III, IV, and V agents, as
classified by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, not be allowed into any
microorganism until better techniques are availalbe. Id. at 993.
7. That is, Escherischia co!£
8. A history of the guidelines promulgated by the National Institutes of Health would
not be adequately treated by a mere summary. The guidelines were originally promulgated on
July 7, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). Most of the subsequent proceedings through De-
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tion of the techniques of rDNA: the creation of new mammalian species
instantaneously10 and probably irreversibly." Numerous studies indicate
that after inserting long stretches of DNA sequences by microinjection 12
into mouse embryos, there is an appropriate change in the outward appear-
ance of the subsequently developed mouse. For example, insertion of rat
growth hormone into mouse embryos results in "supermice."' 3
The application of the mice experiments to humans is within scientific
feasibility.' 4 Furthermore, it is a long standing rule in biology and medicine
cember 1982 are brought together in RECOMBINANT DNA RESEARCH, Volumes 1-7, (U.S.
Government Printing Office) (available at George Washington University Medical Library).
See also Swazey, Sorenson & Wong, Risks and Benefits Rights and Responsibilities A History
of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1978).
For an informed view that there should be no regulation of rDNA by government, see
Szybalski, Dangers of Regulating the Recombinant DNA Technique, 3 TRENDS IN BIOCHEMI-
CAL SCI. 243 (1978).
9. But see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE, A REPORT ON
THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 44-49
(Nov. 1982) (Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C.) (giving a summary of the current facts); and Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Is-
sues in Prospective Human Gene Therapy, 69 VA. L. REV. 515, 541 (1983) (a bioethicist's view
that the supermice experiments will not be misapplied in an abusive manner).
10. That is, within one generation.
11. In other words, the inserted gene can be passed down from generation to generation
through the germ line without the requirement that the inserted gene be present in both par-
ents of the next generation. If the new gene confers some reproductive advantage, its fre-
quency will probably increase in the human population at large. Mankind has thus developed
a limited form of instantaneous evolution.
However, it may be possible in a hypothetical sense to remove the inserted DNA sequences
by, for example, constructing another insert having the capability to excise or remove the
insert of interest, followed by preprogrammed self-destruction of the excised product within
the cell.
12. Hereinafter "insertion by microinjection." See Brinster, et al., Expression of a
Microinjected Immunoglobulin Gene in the Spleen of Transgenic Mice, 306 NATURE 332
(1983); Costantini, et al., Introduction of a Rabbit Beta-Globin Gene into the Mouse Germ Line,
294 NATURE 92 (1981); Hogan, Enhancer, Chromosome Position Effects, and Transgenic Mice,
306 NATURE 313 (1983); Lacy, et al., A Foreign Beta-Globin Gene in Transgenic Mice: Integra-
tion at Abnormal Chromosomal Positions and Expression in Inappropriate Tissues, 34 CELL 343
(1983); Palmiter, et al., Dramatic Growth of Mice that Develop from Eggs Micoinjected with
Metallothionein-Growth Hormone Fusion Genes, 300 NATURE 611 (1982); Storb, High Expres-
sion of Cloned Immunoglobulin Kappa Gene in Transgenic Mice is Restricted to B Lympho-
cytes, 310 NATURE 238 (1984); U~lrich, Transfer of the Human Insulin Gene into the Germ
Line of Mice, 10 BANBURY REP. 37 (1982); and Williams, Mouse and Supermouse, 300 NA-
TURE 575 (1982).
One laboratory is known to have applied for a patent, Palmiter & Brinster, Control of DNA
Sequence Transcription, Pat. Cooperation Treaty, Application No. WO 83/01783 (1983)
(available from the Patent and Trademark Office).
13. Other scientific articles designate supermice as "gigantic mice" or "transgenic mice."
14. The views of Costantini, supra note 12, on the applicability of the mouse experiments
1985]
158 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 1:155
that a mouse is an accurate and economically inexpensive model of the
human body. 5 A scientist or laboratory-trained physician could carry out
experiments on humans with a confidence that he or she would expect a
predictable result in some cases - ten feet tall human beings,' 6 or other
humans having entirely new physical characteristics. 7
II. TECHNICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE SUPERMICE EXPERIMENTS
It is not scientifically feasible at present to clone humans in the sense of
making more genetically identical copies of a particular human being.'" In
to humans are that "currently the success rate for the procedure [on humans] would be quite
low though it is conceivable that in the future it could be a lot higher," T. FRIEDMANN, GENE
THERAPY: FACT AND FICTION IN BIOLOGY'S NEW APPROACH To DISEASE 107 (1983). But
cf Anderson, Prospects for Human Gene Therapy 226 Sci. 401 (1984).
15. See eg., Martin, Neurological Disease: Of Mice and Men, 307 NATURE 10 (1984) (a
discussion of mouse "models" available for the study of human brain disorders). See also
Williams, Lemischka, Nathan & Mulligan, Introduction of New Genetic Material into Pleuri-
potent Haemopoietic Stem Cells, 310 NATURE 476, 479-80 (1984) (noting "inevitable parallels"
between genetic work on mice and "proposed scenarios for gene therapy in man"); E. GREEN,
BIOLOGY OF THE LABORATORY MOUSE (1966) (dustjacket uses the simlar phrase "model
systems").
16. Insertion by microinjection of human growth hormone gene(s) into human embryos
would result in much larger human beings, some of whom would be ten feet tall, others per-
haps twelve feet in height. A fraction of these superhumans would presumably have the talent,
drive, and muscular coordination to become good basketball players. Other superhumans
might have the newly inserted human growth hormone gene expressed in inappropriate tissues.
See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 12. But cf Brinster, supra note 12. Thus, it is predictable that
some of the microinjected embryos would result in ten feet tall basketball players.
17. Other non-recombinant DNA experiments have also resulted in mammals with radi-
cally altered physical attributes, e.g., sheep-goat chimaeras in Fehilly, Willadsen & Tucker,
Interspecific Chimaerism Between Sheep and Goat, 307 NATURE 634 (1984); and in Meinecke-
Tillman & Meinecke, Experimental Chimaeras - Removal of Reproductive Barrier Between
Sheep and Goat, 307 NATURE 637 (1984), but these new mammals do not appear to possess
the capacity to pass their new characteristics to the next generation. See also Williams, supra
note 15.
18. Cloning in amphibians has evidently been achieved. See Smith, GEO. L. J., supra note
1. However, reports of cloning in mammals have not been accepted by the scientific commu-
nity. For example, the mouse cloning experiments of Illmensee, a University of Geneva em-
bryologist, have been publicly condemned as "scientifically worthless." Norman, Illmensee
Faces Funding Cutoff, 224 Sci. 265 (1984); Budiansky, NIH Withdraws Research Grant, 309
NATURE 738 (1984). His data were allegedly fabricated.
Fraud and fabrication of data in the scientific community seem to be more actively and
publicly investigated nowadays. See, e.g., Norman, Reduce Fraud in Seven Easy Steps, 224
Sci. 581 (1984). But cf W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH: FRAUD AND
DECEIT IN THE HALLS OF SCIENCE (1982)(giving a detailed history of purported deceits and
fabrications throughout the entire history of science, even including Gregor Mendel, one of the
guiding lights in nineteenth century genetics).
The experiments on supermice discussed herein have not been questioned as fraudulent by
the scientific community. In addition, there are at least three independent laboratory groups
which have similar results. This indicates that a basic requirement in scientific progress has
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contrast, supermice are only altered by having inserted into their chromo-
somes one or more copies of a small segment 9 of DNA. The only substan-
tial difference between the laboratory procedure of insertion by
microinjection and normal reproductive processes is that the fertilized egg is
taken out of the oviducts at a very early stage, then microinjected2° with
about one hundred to one thousand molecules of the DNA to be inserted,
and immediately reimplanted. Otherwise, normal recombination processes
still occur, including all those that contribute to normal reshuffling of DNA
sequences and genes.
Supermice have extra copies of rat growth hormone.2 Other mice have
rabbit hemoglobin genes inserted.22 Many other genes have not been tried,
but could easily be inserted by microinjection into mice or other mammals,
especially any simple gene coding for a protein having defined and well-
known enzymatic or physiological activity.23 Other, more interesting genes
such as those associated with human personality, intelligence, or mental sta-
bility may not even exist, and if they do exist, their form and structure may
be so complicated as to require many centuries of work to understand. Gene
insertion by microinjection would not be feasible until the appropriate gene
or genes are isolated and characterized.
The present possibility of deliberately creating Frankenstein monsters in
the near future is probably exaggerated24 since the sorts of genes required to
make behavioral monsters are unknown, and the prospects for finding such
been satisfied - reproducibility of data and procedure. One group, headed by Palmiter and
Brinster, has even taken the trouble of applying for a patent. See supra note 12.
19. Roughly 0.0006% of the total quantity of human or mouse DNA in virtually any
human or mouse cell.
20. An experimental procedure wherein fertilized eggs at the one-cell stage are pierced
with an extremely thin needle under a light microscrope. DNA solutions smaller than a drop
are then pumped through the needle into the egg or embryo. See Gordon & Ruddle, Gene
Transfer into Mouse Embryos: Production of Transgenic Mice by Pronuclear Injection, 101
METHODS IN ENZYMOLOGY 411 (1983). This reference is a publicly available description of a
procedure that has the reputation of requiring a great deal of patience and intricate manual
dexterity. The Methods in Enzymology series is an august publication of impeccable repute.
21. Palmiter, supra note 12.
22. Lacy, supra note 12.
23. The list of isolated and sequenced human DNA segments coding for such proteins is
growing by leaps and bounds. The following list is merely illustrative: growth hormone; insu-
lin; somatostatin; fibroblast interferon; many leukocyte interferons; many hemoglobins; opioid
peptides such as adrenocortic trophic hormone, beta-lipotropin, beta-melanotropin, beta-en-
dorphin and methionine-enkephalin; atrial natriuretic polypeptide; chorionic gonadotropin;
prolactin; epidermal growth factor; and many collagens. See, e.g., Halluin, Patenting the Re-
sults of Genetic Engineering Research. An Overview. 10 BANBURY REP. 67, 95-125 (1982).
24. See President's Commission, supra note 9, at 2. On the other hand, the Commission
elsewhere states that " [w]hat might prove more tempting to a dictator or authoritarian ruling
elite [than government control of sexual reproduction on a broad scale] is the possibility of
1985]
160 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 1:155
genes by conventional screening techniques are extremely minute. However,
some human diseases involve a genetic defect in only one gene and produce,
inter alia, severely degenerative changes in human behavior." Accordingly,
it appears that mankind now has a limited 26 capacity to make new human
beings with novel kinds of degenerative behavior.27
III. DAMN THE TORPEDOES - FULL SPEED AHEAD
Most scientific discoveries are in the nature of another example within an
archetypal paradigm, 28 as illustrated by the discovery of a new immu-
noglobulin class after several other classes are already known. An an-
nouncement in a scientific publication of a new immunoglobulin class would
scientists rapidly making major changes in the genetic composition of a small group in the
privacy of the laboratory." Id. at 72.
25. By way of illustration, Lesch-Nyan syndrome is a genetic defect in the enzyme gua-
nine phosphoribosyltransferase, and patients with this disease sometimes bite off their own lips
or exhibit other forms of bizarre self-mutilation. See, eg., A. LEHNINGER, BIOCHEMISTRY 742
(1975). Similarly, patients afflicted with PKU are genetically deficient in the enzyme phenylal-
anine 4-monooxygenase and have an average IQ of less than twenty. See V. McKusicK,
HUMAN GENETICS 87 (1969). See generally J. VAN ABEELEN, THE GENETICS OF BEHAVIOR
(1974) and Letter to the Editor from John Hartung, Professor of Anesthesiology, Downstate
Medical Center, 311 NATURE 515 (1984).
26. A major technical difficulty with this line of experiments is not found with the super-
mice investigations; ie., most genetic defects are recessive in character. Microinjection of a
defective gene prima facie would likely have no effect whatsoever, since the normal functional
gene already in the embryo would eliminate any accumulations due to malfunction of the
defective gene.
On the other hand, the inadvertent creation of Frankenstein monsters in the near future by
benevolent investigators is a distinct possibility. Expression of inserted genes in inappropriate
tissues of supermice has already been discovered and reported (see Hogan and Lacy, supra note
12). Thus, at least hypothetically, a behavioral monster could be inadvertently created by
insertion by microinjection of human growth hormone, resulting in abnormal expression of
growth hormone in brain cells. The monster might have a ten feet tall basketball player as a
sibling.
27. The original story of Dr. Frankenstein's subjectively benevolent motivation and its
consequences may prove to be less than fantastic, if we disregard, inter alia, the story's peculiar
overtones of death and its occult theme of the mysteries in living matter.
So much has been done, exclaimed the soul of Frankenstein - more, far more, will I
achieve: treading in the steps already marked, I will pioneer a new way, explore
unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation.
M. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS) 51 (Airmont Press 1963).
Later in the narrative, Dr. Frankenstein is surprised that his experiments turn out to be a
"catastrophe." Id. at 61.
The United States has been blessed with relatively little political terrorism. This is a symp-
tom perhaps of some ineffable, mythopoetic tradition that an American need only work peace-
fully to achieve personal and professional fulfillment. Accordingly, the prospect of genetic
terrorism by American scientists is farfetched and much less likely than planned experimenta-
tion without destructive motivation.
28. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1967).
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tend to be believed if the data presented were from a reputable laboratory.
On the other hand, some discoveries in science have been the result of outra-
geous and dangerous acts by single individuals, sometimes creating new par-
adigms.2 9 Even if the broad scope of government regulation of rDNA
research encompasses the vast majority of scientists in academic or commer-
cial settings, it is not prima facie obvious that the same regulatory scheme is
sufficient for the scientist or physician with strong personal and professional
instincts of an iconoclastic nature.30
Professor Martin Cline of the University of California at Los Angeles
(UCLA) has already attempted to treat Israeli patients with DNA without
waiting for the UCLA Human Subjects Committee to finish its deliberations
on his proposed experimental protocol.3 1 It should be added that his investi-
gations were conducted outside of the United States and the jurisdiction of
29. Thus, a country doctor named Edward Jenner discovered the principle of vaccination
by, inter alia, inoculating humans with smallpox. Two years later he proposed to present his
findings to the Royal Society, but was warned that "he ought not to risk his reputation by
presenting. . . anything which appeared so much at variance with established knowledge, and
withal so incredible." H. LECHEVALIER & M. SOLOTOROVSKY, THREE CENTURIES OF
MICROBIOLOGY 9 (1965); W. LEFANU, BIo-BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EDWARD JENNER: 1749-1823
22 (1951); L. CLENDENING, SOURCE BOOK OF MEDICAL HISTORY 294-300 (1942). Other
authorities suggest that earlier procedures for inoculation or vaccination were more risky than
those of Jenner. See, e.g., Langer, Immunization Against Smallpox Before Jenner, 234 SCL.
AM. 112 (1976).
In the nineteenth century Metchnikoff, father of cellular immunology, injected himself with
Borrelia. At that time he was apparently aware that if this experiment on himself proved the
disease could be transmitted through the blood, he might die from the injection (he did not,
but he got very sick). See H. LECHEVALIER & M. SOLOTOROVSKY, THREE CENTURIES OF
MICROBIOLOGY 187 (1965); see generally 0. METCHNIKOFF, VIE D'ELIE METCHNIKOFF
(1920). He also swallowed a culture of another pathogenic microorganism at some other pe-
riod of his life. Some of his life work on the cellular basis of the immune response was per-
formed at home in his living room, after his voluntary resignation from a university post.
History tends to remember successful experiments. The vast majority of scientific data accu-
mulated over the course of about the last two or three centuries has never been published, and
most of it is now beyond the point of no return.
Compare, however, the following: Louis Pasteur's good-natured negotiation with the local
authority's objection to the perceived health hazard of his research. See Eisenbert, The Social
Imperatives of Medical Research, 198 SCi. 1105, 1109-10 (1977).
30. Indeed, it has been found by empirical studies that those scientists who publish a lot of
scientific papers, or those physicians having more experience with patients in clinical settings,
each tend to approve the more questionable experiments. See Barber, The Ethics of Experi-
mentation with Human Subjects, 234 SCi. AM. 25 (1976). So there is a lack of uniformity in
attitudes toward human experimentation among scientists and physicians, and those attitudes
themselves appear to be formulated and shaped through experience.
31. The experiments involved in vitro insertion of DNA into the bone marrow cells of
patients having beta-thalassemia, a rare genetic defect in the oxygen-carrying blood protein
hemoglobin, and subsequent implantation of the treated bone marrow cells back into the mar-
row of the patient. This procedure is very different from insertion by microinjection, but it is
gene therapy on humans.
1985]
162 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 1:155
the UCLA Human Subjects Committee. He did obtain permission from the
Israeli Human Subjects Committee to treat patients with DNA but not with
rDNA. His experiments were not successful, but they did result in substan-
tial criticism from the scientific community at large, as well as curtailment of
his government research funds. Yet, he managed to retain his tenured
faculty position.
In subsequent hearings before the House Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight, Professor Cline urged that advances in science are generally
not made by the consensus of the scientific community. 2 This attitude is a
modern 33 example of the determined motivation to achieve some lasting and
beneficial scientific advance. The more spectacular the discovery, the more
desirable it appears. This mind-set can be a natural consequence of practic-
ing impeccably competent science, dressed in the garb of a new priesthood.
It is not necessarily misguided, but it does lack the patience34 to submit to
the more rational process of public debate and criticism from the well-inten-
tioned and even suspicious layman.
Imagine, then, a laboratory-trained physician or scientist with these incli-
nations, one who is without government funding. Suppose he or she has a
genuine belief that particular 35 experiments using insertion by microinjec-
tion on consenting women, one of whom might be the experimenter her-
self,36 would work, and if the experiments were not successful, would result
in spontaneous abortion. 3 No prior approval of an ethics committee is
herein stipulated, whether or not it was requested. The DNA required for
these experiments could be obtained from one of several scientific supply
houses for a modest fee 3 or could be synthesized from organic chemicals.
39
32. See Talbot, Congressional Hearings on "Human Applications of Genetic Engineering"
6 RECOMBINANT DNA TECH. BULL. 1, 2 (1983); T. FRIEDMANN, supra note 14, at 27-29.
33. For similar historical examples, see supra note 29.
34. For a similar but less indulgent view, see Sears, The Concept of Societal Consent for
Recombinant DNA Research and Engineering, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 902, 907-09 (1981).
35. Every creative scientist attempts to think of new wrinkles in a procedure for testing.
The satisfaction in experimental science is partly the process of figuring out what changes in
the experimental protocol will lead to an unambiguous and desired result.
36. This possibility is analogous to Metchnikoff's experiments on himself, supra note 29.
37. Alternatively, experimental success might be judged by amniocentesis, followed by
blot hybridization analysis to ascertain proper location of the integrated gene. See, for a simi-
lar approach, Kazazian, et al., DNA Polymorphisms in the Beta-Globin Gene Cluster: Use in
Discovery of Mutations and Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 BANBURY REP. 29 (1983) and references
cited therein.
38. For example, some scientific supply houses have been selling rabbit hemoglobin mes-
senger RNA (ribonucleic acid) for years. By the technique of reverse transcription, it is a
matter of conventional and straightforward practice to obtain the corresponding DNA se-
quence.
Synthetic DNA fragments can be made to order by several companies. Automated proce-
Eugenics
Other laboratory expenses would be substantial, but well within the reach of
many individuals.
40
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS AGAINST
UNAUTHORIZED USE
The authority of an administrative agency in promulgating its regulations
pursuant to statute cannot exceed the applicable statute. But ever since the
demise of the non-delegation doctrine,4 ' administrative agencies have better
opportunities to interpret and enforce their regulations, particularly those
substantially involving scientific judgments normally handled by the
agency.42
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Act) may provide one likely context
for federal regulation of unauthorized use of DNA insertion by microinjec-
tion.4 3 There are no explicit provisions for DNA molecules under the Act.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) presently does not have a policy
objective of controlling or regulating the microinjection of human DNA into
dures for organic synthesis are currently popular and certainly indicative of future directions.
Many human DNA sequences have been published (see supra note 23), and techniques for
determining DNA sequences are regarded as very accurate. Thus, it is an easy matter to look
up the sequence for a human gene in a scientific periodical and request that sequence from one
of these companies. Current prices are about $25.00 per base, a fee amounting to less than
$7,500 for many typical genes. Two companies assure the buyer of complete confidentiality.
Alternatively, isolation of a human gene with intervening sequences could be performed by
buying a synthesized hybridization probe, probably costing less than one thousand dollars.
Conventional screening of a human DNA library would yield copies of the desired sequence.
39. Manual DNA synthesis kits and gene machines are commercially available, presuma-
bly to any private party.
40. Total cost of all the equipment and reagents for a lengthy series of experiments is
about $25,000 - $100,000, depending on the ingenuity of the experimenter.
41. After Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), few federal cases
have invalidated legislation on the ground of overly broad delegation. See S. BREYER & R.
STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 84 (1979).
42. Thus, for example, Chief Judge Bazelon of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia believes that appellate review of agency decisions involving complex technical issues
should be restricted to strengthening administrative procedure. Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541
F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, concurring), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
More recent Supreme Court decisions also show clear deference on scientific judgments,
even those involving generic rulemaking. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ruled that its licensing boards not consider environmental impact statements on the suitability
of nuclear waste sites for a particular nuclear power plant. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983). But agency rules must provide
enough evidence of "hard look" and other adequate consideration to avoid the arbitrary and
capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1982). See
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982).
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human embryos under its own statutes."
The Act allows the FDA to assert authority over preparations of human
DNA as "drug[s meaning] article[s] (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.",4 5 Without
filing an application with the agency,46 "no person shall introduce or deliver
for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug."' 47 Failure to file is
not, however, a prohibited act,48 and is not subject to the criminal penal-
ties49 of the Act. The drug must be introduced or delivered for introduction
into interstate commerce to be a prohibited act subject to criminal penal-
ties."0 Therefore, it appears that possession of laboratory preparations of
human DNA sequences under the Act is not illegal, even if intended for
malign purposes.
Alternately, preparations of human DNA could be classified either as mis-
branded drugs "from nonregistered establishments" that failed to register as
a new producer, 51 or as adulterated drugs injurious to the health. 52 As with
drugs intended to affect the structure of the body, misbranded or adulterated
drugs under the Act must be introduced in some form into interstate com-
merce. 53 Similarly, failure to register as a new producer is not a prohibited
44. Personal communication of Dr. Henry I. Miller, National Center for Drugs and Bio-
logics, Food and Drug Administration, Rockville, Md. 20857. See also McGarity & Bayer,
Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REv. 461, 519 (1983); 49
Fed. Reg. 50,856-907 (1984).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1982). Since the DNA becomes a part of the human chro-
mosome, the structure of the DNA in the embryo is itself altered, whether or not subsequent
changes in physical appearance, such as height, develop after birth.
Conventional methods of detecting these molecular alterations include sequencing and
Southern blot hybridization. See Maxam & Gilbert, A New Method for Sequencing DNA, 74
Paoc. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 560 (1977); Southern, Detection of Specific Sequences Among DNA
Fragments Separated by Gel Electophoresis, 98 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 503 (1975).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982). Filing an application for approval of a new drug would of
course put the FDA on notice. As of August, 1984, no such applications have apparently been
filed with the Food and Drug Administration for DNA segments intended to add new genes to
the gene pool of a human patient.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 355(aX982).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1982); 21 U.S.C. § 360(g)(1982).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1982).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 331(d)(1982). Even in the case of drug research there is no requirement
that "any clinical investigator submit directly to the secretary reports on the investigational
use of any drugs." See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1982); 21 U.S.C. § 360 (g)(2) and (3)(1982)
51. 21 U.S.C. § 352(o)(1982); 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(1982).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(A)(1982). An analysis of recombinant DNA products generally
as within the jurisdiction of the FDA in the form of misbranded or adulterated drugs can be
found in Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research and the Authority of
the FDA to Require Compliance with the Guidelines, 21 JURIMETRicS 264, 271-72 (1981).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and (b)(1982). Cf 21 U.S.C. § 331(g)(1982) ("The manufacture
within any territory of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.")
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act subject to criminal penalties.
The requirement of interstate commerce would probably be met by ob-
taining DNA samples or laboratory equipment beyond state boundaries. It
is unnecessary that the DNA to be inserted cross state lines. Thus, use of
reactants shipped in interstate commerce to make a laboratory preparation
of vitamin K for injections is within the Act. 4 Courts typically take a dim
view of the defense that the subject product is removed from interstate
commerce.
55
Injunction proceedings 56 could be used to restrain unauthorized use of
human DNA, but they would probably be useless without advance notice to
the agency because the act to be enjoined takes probably less than one day,
perhaps an hour. Microinjection of mouse eggs requires in vitro cultivation
outside of the oviduct only long enough to perform the injection. Further-
more, injunctions under the Act prima facie require notice to the defend-
ant.57 Seizure through condemnation is a much slower process.5"
Another likely candidate for control of human DNA is the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA). 59 This provides control over chemical prod-
ucts,6° testing, and export restrictions.6I District courts have broad
54. United States v. Dianovin Pharmaceuticals, 475 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1973), cert den.,
414 U.S. 830 (1973). Specifically, it was held to be within 35 U.S.C. § 331(k).
55. Compare Cleveland Macaroni Co. v. State Board of Health of Cal., 256 F. 376 (9th
Cir. 1919)(packaged goods shipped across state lines are removed from interstate commerce
when removed from shipping cases and placed on shelves for retail sale) with United States v.
184 Barrels Dried Whole Eggs, 53 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1943)(after inspection failure, dried
eggs under contract to be shipped are removed from interstate commerce if never shipped).
Hence the act of microinjection itself might not be within the meaning of interstate commerce.
56. 21 U.S. § 332 (1982). Any prohibited act discussed above can be enjoined.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1982). An argument could be made around the requirement as fol-
lows. Under 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1982), notice to defendant must conform to the requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 381, a repealed law that included preliminary injunctions and temporary re-
straining orders. See J. MOORE, J. LucAS & K. SINCLAIR, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
65.01-[4] (2d ed. 1984). The repealed version is now "covered" by Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure according to 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1982). Since TRO's under Rule 65(b)
do not require notice, notice to a party about to conduct abusive experiments on humans with
human genes would not be "appropriate" within 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1982).
Similarly, despite the express requirements of notice under 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1982), the FDA
has regulations allowing failure to notify if the Commission of Food and Drugs "has reason to
believe that [notice] may result in the alteration or destruction of evidence or in the prospective
defendant's fleeing to avoid prosecution." See 21 C.F.R. § 7.84(a)(2) (1983).
In a typical situation the FDA warns the defendant before seeking an injunction.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1982); United States v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 511 F.
Supp. 958, 977 (D.N.J. 1981). Seizure after reimplantation would probably be impossible
under the right to privacy of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied 410 U.S. 959
(1973), and its progeny.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1982).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-05 (1982).
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authority for enforcement, seizure, and other forms of relief.62 Temporary
restraining orders are implicitly authorized by statute as a remedy whenever
appropriate. Unfortunately, TSCA was intended to cover products in com-
merce, not drug-like substances that are not environmental pollutants.
The Public Health Service Act 63 provides a scheme for regulating and
controlling biological products," including the power to inspect, but lacks
the ability to enforce non-licensee violations by injunction.65 Other federal
statutes and regulations would require minor revisions to be applicable,
either by legislation or administrative rulemaking.66
The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) of the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH) has at present no jurisdiction over commercial en-
terprises and other private parties without institutional affiliation. It has no
authority to compel compliance with its guidelines, except for institutions
receiving financial support from NIH. 67 This lack of jurisdiction has been
judicially approved as a defense to an attempted preliminary injunction of
rDNA experiments.61
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2611 (1982).
62. "The district court of the United States in which an action... [for use of an "immi-
nently hazardous chemical substance"] is brought shall have jurisdiction to grant such tempo-
rary or permanent relief as may be necessary to protect health or the environment from
unreasonable risk associated with the chemical substance, mixture or article involved in such
action." 15 U.S.C § 2606(b)(1) (1982).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-280a-l (1982).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1982).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f) (1982).
66. Protection of Human Subjects Regulations under the Department of Health and
Human Services has limits in preventing unauthorized use of human genes in supermice exper-
iments and the like. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.211 (1983). These regulations include only
investigations under grants or contracts of the agency. Similar provisions of the FDA deal
exclusively with consent of human patients. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.27 (1983). The Good
Laboratory Practices Regulations exclude studies utilizing human subjects. See 21 C.F.R.
§§ 58.1-58.219 (1983). The Federal Hazardous Substances Act is presently restricted to regu-
lation of manufactured goods intended for household use. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-76 (1982).
67. See 48 Fed. Reg. 24,557 (1983).
The RAC is an advisory committee of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) with the
purpose of, inter alia, reviewing proposals for recombinant DNA experiments at federally
funded institutions. Commercial enterprises frequently submit proposals to this committee,
but submission is voluntary. The composition of the committee is largely comprised of aca-
demics in the scientific fields associated with rDNA.
The jurisdiction of RAC is currently not settled. Despite strong pressure to broaden juris-
diction to maintain consistency, it now has been proposed that each agency involved with
rDNA have its own RAC. See, Sun, Biotechnology's Regulatory Tangle, 225 Scl. 697 (1984);
49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984); Sun, Regulatory Structurefor Biotechnology Proposed, 227 Sci.274
(1985). Generally there seems to be a conspicious absence of any discussion about some type
of legal machinery that can act quickly and effectively in genuinely egregious situations.
68. See Foundation of Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753, 766-67 (D.D.C.
1984).
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Existing federal statutes and regulations presently are not geared to deal
with the proposed scenario. Policy changes of a minor nature are needed, as
well as amendments to laws and regulations currently available.
IV. INJUNCTION OF GENETIC EXPERIMENTS
The equitable remedy of injunction has classically required, inter alia, a
showing by the petitioner of irreparable injury to plaintiff's interests if in-
junctive relief is denied.69 While the abuse of humans with human DNA
through medical experimentation would certainly fit the standard for the
requirement that there be a lack of an adequate legal remedy,70 public policy
and public interest have implicitly been given judicial approval by Judge Sir-
ica in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler.7 This opinion involved a
private plaintiff seeking to enjoin federally funded experiments to spray
DNA on crops. The legal issue was the effect of failing to consider an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement, a consideration of public interest.72 Since the
injunction was issued, release of DNA into the atmosphere, or any type of
release of DNA,73 can be a threatened irreparable injury to a private plain-
tiff, no matter how distant the experiments are.7 4
The availability of a temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice to
the adverse party is very uncertain. First Amendment rights are just about
impossible to enjoin without notice,7 5 but the remedy may turn out to be
69. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). Other factors are (2) a sub-
stantial likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (3) lack of injury to the defendant if
injunctive relief is granted; and (4) the public interest favors preliminary injunctive relief. See
Washington Metropolitan Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc. 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
It is not surprising that a remedy in equity would have alternative requirements. See, eg.,
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1982)(requirement 3 is instead a
showing of threatened injury to plaintiff outweighing threatened harm that injunction would
cause defendant - a more liberal standard for petitioner).
70. See generally Special Project, Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 994 (1965).
71. 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984).
72. Id. at 768.
73. Microinjection may also be a form of release of DNA. But cf. Mack v. Califano, 447
F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. Cir. 1978)(denying a TRO and a preliminary injunction to prevent an
experiment testing the biological properties of polyoma DNA in bacterial cells. The tests were
done at Fort Detrick under conditions that would ensure that no recombinant molecules
would escape from the laboratory.)
74. The Foundation of Economic Trends, one of the plaintiffs, is located in Washington,
D.C., while the DNA spraying experiment was scheduled to take place in California.
75. Carrol v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)(rever-
sal on appeal of temporary restraining order issued without notice to prevent a blatantly racist
rally). Compare Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961),
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adequate when the TRO is denied only after reversal on appeal. The free-
dom to perform and to conduct research may be a protected right as within
the penumbra of the First Amendment76 as well as constituting a substantive
due process right. 7 Evidence sustaining a TRO without notice would have
to be voluminous. Any TRO in this context is not sustainable by the state's
interest in protecting a constitutional right, since an injunction without no-
tice would not protect any constitutional right. But even with judicial recog-
nition that a compelling state or governmental interest in prevention is
greater than any conceivable combination of constitutional defenses7 of the
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962)(defendant's counsel enjoined out of state litigation initially
filed by plaintiff's counsel after plaintiff's counsel informed defendant's counsel about initial
complaint. Injunction upheld on appeal).
76. See generally G. SMITH, supra note 1; Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo and Govern-
ment: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978).
The most relevant research activity at issue here is experimentation, and the right to conduct
it. Having left the realm of hypothesis and invention, the scientist performs physical actions in
the process of experimentation. This 'nonspeech' element may be susceptible to government
regulation and prohibition if "a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968)(upholding con-
victions for draft card burning by antiwar protestors).
The Supreme Court has not yet confronted and decided the question of scientific research as
a First Amendment right. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(mentioning related concepts of freedom of inquiry and free-
dom of thought as examples of penumbras of the First Amendment); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 705 (1972)("The informative function [in the right to gather information] asserted by
representatives of the organized press . . . is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters,
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.")
Whatever the exact legal issue here, be it the right to experiment, to teach, to formulate
hypotheses or to be a passive recipient of knowledge, unauthorized microinjection of human
genes into human embryos would violate a central rationale for protecting freedom of expres-
sion. First Amendment rights should be in part the liberty to participate in decision making in
order to facilitate orderly change. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION 6-8 (1970). Performance of the experiments in the proposed scenario without prior ethics
review is precisely the failure to so participate. Such unauthorized experiments would disrupt
the orderly assimilation of science in its function as an instrumentality of progress and orderly
change.
It seems unlikely that specific prohibitions against the unauthorized use of microinjection
technology on human beings would promote deception and underground experimentation.
The availability of alternative ways to obtain authorization might be one way of assuring uni-
form cooperation.
77. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). See also G. SMITH, supra note 1, at
129; Delgado & Miller, supra note 76, at 395.
78. Perhaps the best constitutional defense available is that an injunction against the use
of human genes is in effect a content-related restriction of the freedom of expression. The
argument may be structured as follows. Traditional content restrictions have been limited to
expressive activities bearing "no essential part of any exposition of ideas and of ... slight
social value," such as pornography or libel. See Delgado & Miller, supra note 76, at 380, and
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investigator, a TRO would be too slow in many instances.
V. REGULATION OF HUMAN DNA SEQUENCES AND OTHER
SUGGESTIONS
The critical problem of timely warning to some governmental body is not
solved by regulatory authority to investigate the names of parties submitted
to the FDA by others.79 What is needed is some kind of monitoring system
for laboratory preparations of human genes and sequences. 80 Commercial
enterprises should be required to register all buyers of human genes, or iden-
tifiable portions thereof." A suggestion for a registry of all new rDNA
products has already been made.82 Other more effective tactics for alerting
authority might include certification of clinical and nonclinicial investigators
who use human genes, creation of a centralized computer bank for the stor-
age locations of human genes, or designation of human DNA sequences as
controlled substances8 3 subject to the sort of enforcement provisions in the
legal use of opiate and other addictive drugs. An extreme solution is the
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Since experimentation is essential to
scientific research, a content restriction would only be permissible if great social or governmen-
tal interests were at stake. Delgrado & Miller, supra note 76, at 380-81.
However, the ihitial judical reaction in Foundation on Economic Trends, supra note 71, sug-
gests that the present social or governmental interests are indeed great enough to restrict the
research.
79. 37 C.F.R. § 310.9 (1984).
80. This is to be distinguished from the presently available data bases of DNA sequences.
For example, the National Biomedical Research Foundation of Washington, D.C., provides
computerized analysis of published DNA sequences for a fee. These data bases do not provide
information about the storage location of preparations of particular human genes. The scien-
tific team for a past project in cloning a human gene may have disbanded. Members of the
team may have taken a sample with them.
81. All genes are composed of subunits that are common to all other genes. These
subunits are nucleotide bases or, on another level, codons. It is possible to identify a portion of
a gene if the string of bases (or codons) is long enough to make it unique. See, e.g., Southern,
supra note 45.
82. The Interagency Committee on Recombinant DNA Research, chaired by Donald
Fredickson, director of NIH, agreed that registration was an "important element of regula-
tion" and should occur before the use or production of recombinant DNA molecules. See 2
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, docu-
ments relating to NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, Janu-
ary 1980 - December 1980, 268 (1981). To date, this suggestion has not been acted on. There
is arguable support under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) for requiring registration
of human genes under 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982), but there is no provision for keeping track of
samples. See also 15 U.S.C § 2603(0(1982). A general registry of all new recombinant DNA
products under TSCA has been proposed by McGarity, supra note 44, at 510.
83. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (DAPCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1982).
Designation of human genes as a Schedule I controlled substance by the Attorney General
would give the government power to enjoin without notice to the defendant. DAPCA was
intended for "psychotropic" drugs, but gene sequences causing degenerative changes in behav-
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provision for recovery of attorney's fees84 after successful prosecution of un-
authorized parties.
A likely possibility is the exploitation of the microinjection technology by
some foreign countries. There are at present no explicit export controls on
rDNA molecules.8" Such regulations would not prevent an outside country
from synthesizing a known DNA sequence from a scientific periodical, but
they would make access to preparations of human DNA more limited and
more difficult.
The chilling effects of litigation and regulation on scientific and medical
research cannot be denied. Scientists are typically uninterested or even hos-
tile to controversies and governmental controls involving substantial
amounts of "paperwork. ' 86 Similarly, the burden of writing grant applica-
tions is frequently regarded as largely a waste of time. Any regulations
designed to curb the misuse of human genes in vitro would be most effective
if they do not create substantial burdens that take the individual investigator
away from the laboratory or clinic.
VI. STATE LAW
In the wake of the abortion decision of the Supreme Court allowing the
right to terminate pregnancy during the first trimester without regard to the
state's interest," most states have passed laws to prevent abuse in the han-
dling of aborted fetuses.88 Many of these laws do not expressly forbid exper-
imentation with or transfer of an embryo,89 that stage of development long
ior, see supra notes 25 and 26, would obviously affect the mind. Research provisions are in
place, 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(0, 827(0, 873(e) (1982), and registration is required.
84. The likelihood of frivolous litigation may be diminshed by a 1983 amendment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, providing a broader scope of sanctions, such as sanctions
against attorneys signing and filing pleadings "interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass" FED. R. Civ. P. ll(as amended effective Aug. 1, 1983). Id. advisory committee note.
85. See Cooper, US. Export Controls on Biotechnology, 6 RECOMBINANT DNA TECH.
BULL. 12, 12-13 (1983)(detailing how the International Trade Administration could regulate
this under the Export Administration Act of 1979).
86. For an example of a common view of bureaucracy from a scientist's perspective, see
Szybalski, supra note 8.
87. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. For a bird's eye view on how to counsel client couples undertaking some form of in
vitro fertilization, see Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technol-
ogies, 70 A.B.A.J. 50-56 (1984). Some of the state law analysis in note 89 infra is derived from
a table in this article.
89. For example, three states forbid experimentation on a human conceptus well past
early embryonic stages in developmental differentiation, but did not include any language on
embryos. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-342 and 28-346 (1979) (silent on embryos and the like);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02 (Allen Smith 1981)(covers only "fetus"); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-
6-115 (1977)(restricted to "child"). All other states have no laws prohibiting the donation of a
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before the fetus is considered to possess "meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."'  Massachusetts9" has a model statute with language pro-
viding criminal penalties for, inter alia, unauthorized92 human experiments
in the nature of the supermice investigations. These laws appear generally to
be intended to prevent unethical practices incidental to an abortion. Still, it
seems that little support should be found in the future for the defense that a
supermice type of experiment performed by unauthorized parties on human
embryos is merely an investigation outside of the context of abortion.93
VII. CONCLUSIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF PRIVATE EUGENICS
The supermice experiments are a spectacular advance in rDNA research
and in science generally. The intent and purpose of these investigations are
to probe the process of differentiation in mammals, and to ascertain the ex-
tent and effect of new genes on subsequent development. It would be very
unfortunate if further experiments along these lines on mice and other lower
mammals were condemned, outlawed, restricted,94 or even made secret. Sci-
entific knowledge aside, the commercial potential and benefit of similar ex-
periments on cattle, goats, and milking cows are vast, perhaps nearly as
live fetus or embryo for experimentation without an abortion, except Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.422 (West Supp. 1984)(violation a misdemeanor, not a felony); Massachusetts,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12J.(a) IV (1983) ("No person shall knowingly sell, trans-
fer, distribute or give away any fetus . . . [for scientific, laboratory research or other kind of
experimentation]. For purposes of this section, the word "fetus" shall include also an embryo
or neonate."); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975); Louisiana,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87(2) (West 1974); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593
(West 1983); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685 - 333.2692 (West 1980) (for-
bidding any experimentation on a live human embryo, fetus, or neonate "not designed to im-
prove the health of the research subject . . ., based upon the available knowledge or
information at the approximate time of research."); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-5
(1978); and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-2(0 (Supp. 1984).
Hence, only ibout eleven states prohibit experimentation on an embryo or fetus when not
performed in conjunction with an abortion.
90. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
91. See supra note 89.
92. "flIt shall be a complete defense that at the time of ... [the experimentation] the
subject procedure had received the written approval of a duly appointed Institutional Review
Board" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12J (a)VI (West 1983)
93. Compelling state interest probably would be the overriding consideration, (See supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text), even with the additional defense that freedom to experi-
ment should be a fundamental interest incorporated by the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. It has already been suggested that the Supreme Court would incorporate
the freedom to experiment. See Delgado & Miller, supra note 76, at 400-01.
94. It has been proposed by Mr. Jeremy Rifkin of the Foundation of Economic Trends
that NIH condemn any gene transfer from one mammalian species into the germ line of an-
other unrelated mammalian species. See 49 Fed. Reg. 37,016-7 (1984).
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revolutionary as the cultivation of crops or the domestication of animals."
The chief difference between the present achievements and the future is
that no similar experiments on humans have apparently been undertaken.
Since human genes are eo ipso chemically different from genes of all other
mammals, control and regulation of their use by private parties are a rela-
tively straight-forward96 process of identifying and tracking DNA seqences
derived from humans.
The chaotic nature of state law makes a uniform federal statute desirable.
Express provisions under federal law against possession or any use of human
gene preparations by private parties without institutional or commercial af-
filiations would be better, if these controls allow as a defense the prior ap-
proval by an institutional review board or other ethics committee.97 Rapid
enforcement and vigilant tracking will reduce the chance of abuse. Other-
wise, a greater risk of creating sensational human creatures will always lurk
in the background.
It is probably impossible to prevent all well-intentioned experiments along
the lines of the scenario presented in this article. Stiff criminal penalties may
deter some but not all, in view of possibility of fame for the successful
experimenter.
Let us not become the inadvertent beneficiary of some self-appointed mod-
em Prometheus.
Roy D. Meredith
95. For a recent survey of relevant legal literature, see Jones, Genetic Engineering in Do-
mestic Food Animals.- Legal and Regulatory Considerations, 38 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 273
(1983).
96. Some proteins are highly conserved in mammals, such as histones, which are DNA
binding proteins. However, the resulting increase in the burden of tracking highly conserved
genes derived from non-human mammalian sources would probably be minimal, because most
human genes (and sufficiently long stretches thereof) are distinctly different in sequence from
those in all other mammals.
97. To restrict these laws to supermice type of experiments, ie., insertion by microinjec-
tion, may not be advisable. Cloning, parthenogenesis, and other aberrant forms of evolution
may be successfully applied in the near future to mice or other mammals. The recent creation
of mammalian chimaeras, supra note 17, by non-recombinant DNA methods, suggests the
obvious: a recent surge of interest in experimental programs in this general area of scientific
knowledge.
